In complete markets economies (Sandroni [15]), or in economies with Pareto optimal outcomes (Blume and Easley [9]), the market selection hypothesis holds, as long as traders have identical discount factors. Traders who survive must have beliefs that merge with the truth. We show that in incomplete markets, regardless of traders' discount factors, the market selects for a range of beliefs, at least some of which do not merge with the truth.
Introduction
Do markets select for correct expectations? The market selection hypothesis (Alchian [1] , Friedman [12] ) is one of the longest standing conjectures in economics. Traders who form more accurate predictions about future returns make more money at the expense of those who don't. In the long run all traders with inaccurate beliefs are driven out of the market and the only surviving ones have correct expectations. This hypothesis has a strong intuitive appeal and, if true, provides a robust justification to the assumption of rational expectations in both microeconomic and macroeconomic models. Given that long run market outcomes only reflect correct expectations, economists interested in the long run may as well assume rational expectations from the outset.
To test the validity of this conjecture, suppose that two traders disagree on the probability with which a particular state of nature occurs. If this disagreement does not have an impact on asymptotic wealth accumulation and survival, then Friedman's conjecture does not hold. Hence the market selection hypothesis requires that the trader with correct expectations is able to accumulate wealth at the other trader's expense by betting against him on the future realisation of that particular state of nature. It is only when there is a market that allows the two traders to make these bets that the trader with correct beliefs can actually accumulate more wealth than the other trader and drive him out of the market. When a state of nature can only be partially insured against by the existing market structure, the link between accuracy of beliefs and survival becomes weaker.
We know that when markets are complete [15] , or when the allocation is Pareto optimal [9] correct beliefs are selected for by market forces 1 . In particular, heterogeneity of beliefs does not persist, and all surviving traders have either correct beliefs or beliefs which merge with the true probability distribution. Blume and Easley [9] argue by providing counterexamples that the same need not hold when markets are incomplete. In this paper we
show that in incomplete markets economies, regardless of traders' discount factors, the set of beliefs which are consistent with traders' survival contains beliefs that are not equivalent to the true probability distribution. So the market selection hypothesis does not hold in incomplete markets. We also show in a class of economies that there exist surviving traders with beliefs that do not merge with the truth and these beliefs matter: were they to adopt correct beliefs, equilibrium prices would change and they may no longer survive. These surviving traders may be more impatient than other traders with correct beliefs. This stands in stark contrast to Blume and Easley's result that surviving traders must have either beliefs closer to the truth than other traders or be sufficiently patient to compensate for their incorrect beliefs.
We consider an economy with an open ended future and a finite number of traders. Every period, traders trade securities to hedge their stochastic endowment risk. Preferences are of the expected utility form and utility from future consumption is discounted at a rate that is allowed to differ across traders. There are many consumption goods each period, but the securities pay off only in terms of a numeraire good. Also, securities are short-lived. These last two assumptions do not affect the intuition of the result but considerably simplify the analysis and guarantee existence of an equilibrium (see Magill and Quinzii ([14] )). Otherwise, the asset structure is rather general in that the payoff matrix may change from period to period.
The infinite horizon economy that we model satisfies conditions for existence of an equilibrium with a transversality condition. This requires traders not to borrow and roll over their debt ad infinitum.
Our first result is that traders who survive admit beliefs that are not equivalent to the true probability distribution. To prove our result, we introduce the notion of effectively identical beliefs as the set of probability distributions for some trader that are consistent with the same overall equilibrium. Given an initial economy and its corresponding equilibrium, if some trader were to adopt beliefs that are effectively identical to his original beliefs, then the new equilibrium outcome would remain unchanged. We then
show that the set of effectively identical beliefs is a singleton under complete markets. By contrast, this set is not a singleton in incomplete markets.
Moreover, there exists a probability distribution that belongs to this set that is not equivalent to the truth. This has straightforward and important con-5 sequences for belief selection in incomplete markets. Suppose that a trader survives, our first result shows that there are probability distributions that are not equivalent to the truth which are consistent with his survival. Hence incomplete markets fail to select for traders with correct expectations.
While our first result shows that incomplete markets select for a wide range of beliefs, our second result shows that surviving traders whose beliefs are incorrect affect asset prices.We consider a two-trader economy and the corresponding no-trade outcome. Assuming that the first trader has correct beliefs, we can assign a discount factor and beliefs to the other trader such that she is more impatient than the first trader, has incorrect beliefs and survives. These beliefs matter because the equilibrium price sequence of assets would change were she to adopt beliefs that are correct. This is because the truth does not lie within her set of effectively identical beliefs. Hence traders with incorrect beliefs who survive need not behave as though they know the truth. Note that these results do not hold in comparable complete markets economies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we summarise the existing literature. In section 3, we present the model: we start by providing the intuition for our main results in a simple two-period model (subsection 3.1), then we go on to describe the infinite horizon economy which always admits an equilibrium with a transversality condition. Section 4 contains our first result. Section 5 contains our second result. Section 6 concludes the paper. For ease of exposition, all proofs are in the appendix. 
Related Literature
The first attempts to validate the market selection hypothesis date back to the early 90s and address the related issue of whether markets select for rationality, with particular focus on the survival of noise traders. Shefrin and
Statman [17] ask whether noise traders survive in financial markets by developing a model where rational and informed Bayesian traders interact with traders that make systematic cognitive errors. They show that, provided that noise traders are patient enough and that they do not commit errors that are "too serious", they will not be driven to extinction by informed traders.
De Long et al. [10] and [11] prove that noise traders can eventually come to dominate the market, if they unwillingly happen to make "good" cognitive mistakes. Biais and Shadur [5] consider a market where non-overlapping generations of buyers and sellers trade to share risk. They show that irrational traders, who misperceive the risk but enjoy a higher bargaining power, might outperform rational traders who correctly assess the distribution of the risk.
While this literature assumes asset prices to be exogenous, the paper by Blume and Easley [8] addresses the same problem in a market model, where asset prices are determined endogenously and reflect the dynamics of the wealth shares of the different types of traders, each represented by a portfolio rule. They find that, as long as traders save at the same rate, markets do not select for rationality, but rather for a specific attitude towards risk.
In particular logarithmic utility maximisers with accurate beliefs accumulate 7 wealth at a faster rate than any other trader. As a result, they determine asset prices asymptotically and drive to extinction any other trader. Hence within this framework markets do not select necessarily for rationality, but rather for a specific portfolio rule. Irrational traders, or traders with inaccurate expectations, may well survive if their mistakes or irrationality imply that their portfolio rules are closer to the portfolio rule of a log maximiser.
On the other hand, rational traders with correct expectations may well vanish, if they happen to have the wrong attitude towards risk.
The results from this early literature are important in that they formalise
through wealth dynamics what one might mean by market selection. They are also quite provocative because they make it very clear that expected utility maximisation and survival are distinct objectives. Hence rational behaviour is not necessarily selected for by market forces and the market selection hypothesis need not hold within this setting.
Sandroni [15] Traders can trade J ≤ S securities whose period 1 payoff is the full rank S × J matrix A. They trade these securities to hedge against their period 1 stochastic endowment ω ∈ R S ++ . Consumption takes place in period 1 only.
In an equilibrium, period 0 asset prices q ∈ R J ++ have to satisfy the no arbitrage equation:
where
++ is trader i's utility gradient and where π i 0 ∈ R ++ is a multiplier. The resulting ratio
is trader i's normalized utility gradient or his state price vector. In the complete markets case, we get the usual condition that this ratio is equated across traders. 2 Note that π
when traders have preferences of the expected utility form and their beliefs are represented by the probability distribution ρ i . In the complete markets case, given an equilibrium outcome (x * , q * ), there exists only one set of be-
. This is because there are S equations in S unknowns.
The only solution is the original normalized vector ρ i ∈ R S .
In the incomplete markets case, J < S and this system of equations may have multiple solutions. To guarantee multiple solutions to the noarbitrage equation, one needs to assume that J < S − 1. The additional degree of freedom is used to ensure that the resulting solution is a probability distribution. So, given an economy and a resulting equilibrium outcome, and for any trader i ∈ I, there exist many probability distributions that are consistent with the original equilibrium: The latter is also an equilibrium of any economy where all traders' preferences remain unchanged, except for trader i. His beliefs can be any
now represents trader i's utility gradient under the new beliefs λ i . When J < S − 1, these beliefs exist. The intuition of this analysis is essentially the same in infinite horizon economies and ultimately drives our main result.
Turning to the case of infinite horizon economies, suppose that traders trade the same set of short-lived securities whose payoff next period is the matrix A. The no arbitrage equation takes the form:
++ is trader i's utility gradient for period t + 1 when the current state of the world is s t and where π i (s t ) ∈ R ++ is the marginal utility of consumption in node s t of the date-event tree. Again, we consider the case of expected utility maximizers. Consider a particular economy and the resulting equilibrium outcome. Suppose that trader i ∈ I has beliefs represented by a probability distribution ρ i . We wish to construct a probability distribution λ i 6 = ρ i such that the original equilibrium is still an equilibrium when trader i ad opts beliefs λ i . We do this by rewriting the no arbitrage equation (2):
Where
++ is the conditional probability distribution of period t + 1 events, conditioning on the current state of the world s t and where M i (s t ) is an S × J matrix determined in equilibrium. We show that there exists a unique probability distribution ρ i which satisfies equation (3) in the complete markets case. When J < S − 1, one can choose conditional probabilities λ i (t + 1|s t ) 6 = ρ i (t + 1|s t ) for each node in the date-event tree.
Then one can construct a probability distribution λ i over infinite events by using Kolmogorov's existence theorem. This implies that in the incomplete markets case, one can choose a probability distribution λ i that is effectively
One can also choose λ i such that λ i and ρ i are not equivalent. This requires that the marginals ρ i (t + 1|s t ) are uniformly bounded away from the edges of the unit simplex. We can then choose λ i uniformly bounded away from ρ i . The theorem of Blackwell and Dubins [7] then implies that these distributions cannot be equivalent.
It follows that in an incomplete markets economy, observing a trader survive does not imply that his beliefs are equivalent to the truth. The above procedure can be used to construct beliefs for this trader that are not equivalent to the truth but that guarantee his survival in a way that is identical to the original economy. This is in contrast to the complete markets or Pareto efficient economy. In these economies and controlling for discount factors, traders who survive must have the truth be absolutely continuous with respect to their beliefs.
The second result, presented in section 5, shows that one can change both a trader's discount factor (by making her more impatient, for example) and her beliefs. If her beliefs are chosen such that the marginals are bounded away from the unit simplex, then one can find beliefs effectively identical to these new beliefs that are far away from the truth. The outcome is that this trader will survive and her wrong beliefs will influence equilibrium prices.
The Infinite Horizon Economy
The economy we model is a special case of the economy analyzed by Magill and Quinzii [14] . Our notation combines elements of [14] , Araujo and
Sandroni [3] and Sandroni [15] . Let T = {0, 1, ..} denote the set of time periods. Every period, the set of possible states is T = {1, .., S}, S ∈ N.
T t is the t−Cartesian product of T . Let S = {s 0 } × T ∞ be the set of all possible infinite sequences of T where s 0 ∈ T acts as the root element.
Throughout, we use the notation s t = (s 0 , s 1 , .., s t ) for an element s t ∈ T t .
All elements are taken to have {s 0 } as root so s t ∈ T t necessarily means
We can represent the information revelation process in this economy through a sequence of finite partitions of the state space S. In particular, define the cylinder with base on s t ∈ T t , t ∈ T as C(s t ) = {s ∈ T ∞ |s = (s t , ..)}. Let F t = {C(s t ) : s t ∈ T t } be a partition of the set S. Clearly, F = (F 0 , .., F t , ..) denotes a sequence of finite partitions of S such that F 0 = {S} and F t is finer 3 than F t−1 . We assume that all traders have identical information and that the information revelation process is represented by the sequence F. Let D = ∪ t∈T,σt∈Ft (t, σ t ) denote the date-event tree and
subset of successor nodes of s t at date T , i.e. all elements s T ∈ T T such that
.). Let F t be the set consisting of all finite unions of cylinders with base on T t . It is easily shown that F t is a σ−field. Note that
Define F 0 as the trivial σ−field. Let F = σ (∪ t∈N F t ). It can be shown that {F t } t∈N is a filtration. Let ρ i be trader i's beliefs on S represented by a probability measure on (T ∞ , F ). Let E ρ i be the expectation operator associated
t (.)(s) be the expectation operator associated with ρ i st when s = (s t , ..) and where:
There are I= {1, .., I} infinitely lived traders, L = {1, .., L} goods at each node. So D × L is the set of all goods over all nodes. Let R D×L denote the
denote trader i's consumption set. Let p ∈ R D×L be the spot price process and set p(s t , 1) = 1 for all s t ∈ D so 1 is the numeraire good. 5 Further, we consider only short-lived numeraire securities. Let J(s t ) be the set of securities issued at node s t ∈ T t . j(s t ) = #J(s t ) < ∞ is the number of securities. A j (s t , s) is the payoff of security j ∈ J(s t ) in the immediate
Finally, let A t+1 (s t ) denote the S×j(s t ) matrix of payoffs in period t+1. Also,
is the process of security payoffs. We assume that all securities pay off in terms of the numeraire good.
Let q(s t ) = (q j (s t ) : j ∈ J(s t )) be the 1 × j(s t ) vector of node s t security prices. q = (q(s t ) : s t ∈ D) ∈ Π st∈D R J(st) = Q be the security price process, an element of the security price space.
Z be the portfolio process for trader i, an element of the portfolio space,
¢ is the j(s t ) × 1 portfolio vector of trader i at node s t .
Let º i represent trader i 0 s preference ordering over X i . Preferences º i are represented by an additively separable utility function:
is the probability of s t ∈ T t , δ i ∈ (0, 1) is an intertemporal discount factor and v i : R L + → R is a continuous, increasing and concave function with v i (0) = 0. These assumptions on the utility function satisfy
Mackey continuity (as shown in [4] ). 6 Let º= (º 1 , .., Assumption B There exists a riskless bond at every node s t ∈ D. Formally, there is a j ∈ J(s t ) so that A j (s t , s) = 1 for all s ∈ T .
Assumption B can be replaced with the condition that for each node s t ∈ D, there exists a portfolio of securities
In this economy, assumptions A and B satisfy all conditions needed (see section 3 of [14] ) for the existence of an equilibrium in open-ended incomplete markets economies. They are assumed to hold throughout this paper.
Equilibrium with a Transversality Condition
With the assumption that z i (s −1 ) = 0, and that preferences are strictly monotone, the trader's budget constraint at node s t ∈ D is:
In infinite horizon economies, a trader can borrow and roll over his debt ad infinitum. So we need a transversality condition to ensure that there is a bound on the rate at which the trader accumulates debt.
So the budget set for trader i is:
for each i ∈ I:
(a) π i (s t ) > 0,for all s t ∈ D and
Theorem 2 Each economy E ∞ (D, º, ω, A) satisfying the above assumptions has an equilibrium.
Proof. Theorem 5.1 of [14] .
The assumption that assets must be short-lived and must pay off in terms of a numeraire good ensures that an equilibrium exists. Is it however only a simplifying assumption as the results in this paper rest on analyzing the no arbitrage equation which must hold in equilibrium regardless of the particular asset structure.
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4 Belief Selection
Effectively Identical Beliefs
The set of beliefs that a trader adopts that yield the same equilibrium outcome is the set of effectively identical beliefs for this trader, defined below.
is an equilibrium of an economy E ∞ (D, ρ, v, ω, A). We say that trader i's beliefs ρ i are effectively identical to λ i (a probability measure on (S, F)) if there exists an equilibrium
We write
A sufficient condition for a probability distribution ρ i to be effectively identical to the beliefs of some trader is that the no-arbitrage equation (6) is satisfied where
As beliefs change, so does the way traders value the future. Hence, the definition imposes that equilibrium allocations and prices are identical for different (but effectively identical)
beliefs. The resulting state price process for trader i is different precisely because the probability distributions ρ i and λ i are different.
Equilibrium security prices can reveal some information about a trader's beliefs. The price of a security in node s t represents trader i's marginal utility of consuming the stream of this security's payoff across successor nodes.
Along with a trader's actual consumption over these nodes, one can extract some information about this trader's beliefs over successor nodes. In a com-plete markets economy, security prices reveal these beliefs perfectly. Equilibrium security prices and consumption for a given node s t can be summarized in the no-arbitrage equation:
M i (s t ) is a matrix determined by the equilibrium consumption of trader i in successor nodes of s t . This is the traditional no-arbitrage equation (6) rewritten to make trader i's conditional beliefs more apparent. Given an equilibrium, this trader's conditional beliefs can then be extracted from this equation. These conditional beliefs, over all nodes, can be then put together to construct beliefs over the whole σ−field. We say that an economy E ∞ (D, º , ω, A) has complete markets if j(s t ) = b(s t ) for all s t ∈ D and the S × j(s t ) matrix A t+1 (s t ) has full rank for all s t ∈ D. The complete markets result is summarized in the proposition below.
is an equilibrium of a complete markets economy E ∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then the set of effectively identical beliefs for each trader is a singleton.
In contrast, equation This assumption is stronger than the usual one for market incompleteness.
The additional degree of freedom is used in the proof of the next proposition to ensure that candidate solutions to equation (7) are probability distributions.
Proposition 5 Under assumption 1, suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (π i ) i∈I ) is an equilibrium of an incomplete markets economy E ∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then the set of effectively identical beliefs for each trader is not a singleton.
The above proposition has some straightforward implications in terms of belief selection in incomplete markets. Let ρ be the true probability distribution on (S, F ). We say that trader i has rational expectations (or correct beliefs) if ρ i = ρ. Blume and Easley [9] define survival of trader i on a path s ∈ S if lim sup t x i (s t ) > 0. An implication of the above propositions in the incomplete markets case is that each trader with rational expectations has effectively identical beliefs which are not correct. Also, each trader that survives ρ−almost surely has effectively identical beliefs which are not correct.
Suppose we can observe all aspects of the economy except traders' beliefs.
Then, given an equilibrium of that economy, we could not conclude that a trader who survives has correct beliefs. This definition of belief correctness is however very strong. A trader whose conditional beliefs are identical to the truth in all nodes except one node, has incorrect beliefs. In the Pareto optimal economy discussed in Blume and Easley [9] , this trader may survive (if we control for other factors).
Homogeneity of Beliefs
Blume and Easley [9] show that a necessary condition for survival is that the Assumption 2 There must exist an ε 0 > 0 such that the ε 0 −ball
The first step is to construct effectively identical beliefs that are not equivalent to a trader's original beliefs. We do this by constructing conditional beliefs uniformly bounded away from original beliefs, we then use Blackwell 7 We use the sup norm (kxk S = sup i∈S |x i |).
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and Dubin's theorem to show that these new beliefs cannot be equivalent to original beliefs. We recall the following definition and result.
Definition 6 Agent i ∈ I and j ∈ I's beliefs eventually become homogeneous if there is a set A ∈ F such that : P k (A) = 1 for k = i, j and for all s ∈ A,
Proposition 7 If two probability measures are equivalent (meaning: ρ i (B) = 0 ⇔ ρ j (B) = 0 for all B ∈ F ) then the posterior probabilities eventually become homogeneous.
Proof. Blackwell and Dubins (1962).
Evidently, we must strengthen our notion of market incompleteness to ensure that we can choose effectively identical conditional beliefs sufficiently far away from original beliefs, infinitely often. A sufficient condition for assumption 2 is that markets are incomplete at every node in the tree with Rank(A j (s t , t + 1)) < S − 1.
Proposition 8 Under assumptions 2 and 3, suppose that
is an equilibrium of an economy E ∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then the set of effectively identical beliefs for trader i ∈ I contains beliefs not equivalent to ρ i .
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The main result of this paper is an implication of the following corollary.
Corollary 9 Under assumptions 2 and 3, suppose that (x, z),
is an equilibrium of an economy E ∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then the set of effectively identical beliefs for trader i ∈ I contains beliefs not equivalent to the true probability distribution ρ.
Proof. If trader i's beliefs are not equivalent to ρ, then we're done. If they are, use the previous proposition.
If we can observe all aspects of the economy except for traders' beliefs, then given an equilibrium, a trader who survives ρ−a.s. has beliefs consistent with this survival that are not equivalent to ρ. This is in contrast to the Pareto optimal result of Blume and Easley [9] . Note that our result doesn't rely on assumptions about discount factors, or even the precise definition of survival. This is because it is the no-arbitrage equation along with the asset structure that determines a trader's set of effectively identical beliefs, in particular a surviving trader's beliefs.
We also obtain the result that two traders who survive may strongly disagree about the truth. This is a direct implication of the following Corollary 10 Under assumptions 2 and 3, suppose that (x, z),
is an equilibrium of an economy E ∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then each trader has effectively identical beliefs that are not equivalent to another trader's beliefs.
Finally, note that in incomplete markets economies with Pareto efficient outcomes, all traders beliefs must converge with the truth (see for example
Sandroni [15] ). Because of the asset structure, we may construct effectively identical beliefs for the surviving traders that do not merge with the truth. In this case, the original outcome is still an equilibrium but it is no longer Pareto efficient: so any incomplete markets equilibrium outcome where traders with incorrect beliefs survive almost surely with respect to the truth must be Pareto efficient. This result is expected since outcomes are generically Pareto inefficient in incomplete markets economies, but it shows that the above results are not in contradiction with previous work on belief selection in Pareto efficient economies.
Survival in a Two Trader Economy
We have shown that incomplete markets select for a wide range of beliefs, including beliefs that do not merge with the truth. However when all surviving traders have beliefs that are effectively identical to the truth, incorrect expectations may not affect the asset price process. As a result, incomplete markets may select for beliefs that are incorrect in ways that are irrelevant for survival. In a simple two-trader economy, we show that traders with incorrect beliefs may both survive and affect asset prices.
We consider an economy with two identical traders i and j and the corresponding no-trade outcome. Initially, we assume that both traders know the truth. Because there is no trade, both traders survive according to any probability distribution. We modify the economy by assigning trader i a dif- The sets A * (s t ) are constructed in the proof of the following proposition. 
We have the following properties in the new economy E
Trader
Trader i's incorrect beliefs may be far from the truth (property #3) and these beliefs matter (property #2): if trader i were to adopt correct beliefs λ, equilibrium prices will change and she may no longer survive λ − a.s. Note that trader i may be chosen so that she is more impatient than the other trader.
For example, if endowments and payoffs are stationary and beliefs and the truth are iid, Blume and Easley [9] show that a trader who survives almost surely with respect to the truth must have the highest survival index 8 . Here, trader i may be chosen to be more impatient and have incorrect beliefs so her survival index is smaller than trader j's, yet she survives λ − a.s.
Conclusion
In this paper we model an infinite horizon economy, with a view to testing the market selection hypothesis under market incompleteness. We know from the literature (Sandroni [15] , Blume and Easley [9] ) that markets with a Pareto optimal outcome or, more narrowly, complete markets select for correct beliefs. All surviving traders have correct beliefs (i.e. beliefs that can 8 log δ k − I ρ (ρ k ) where δ k is trader k's discount factor and I ρ (ρ k ) is the relative entropy of trader k's beliefs with respect to the truth. be represented by probability distributions that merge with the truth). Both wealth and consumption of traders whose beliefs are incorrect converge to zero with true probability one. Hence in the long run heterogeneity of beliefs is not persistent and market outcomes reflect the true probability distribution over returns.
The motivation for our study lies in two counterexamples provided by Blume and Easley [9] that point to the fact that the same need not hold under market incompleteness. In this paper we show that incomplete markets do not select for correct beliefs. In particular we prove that when markets are incomplete the set of beliefs that is consistent with a trader's survival admits beliefs which are not equivalent to the truth, and these incorrect beliefs may matter.
We build our first result on the characterisation of the set of effectively identical beliefs. Given an economy and its corresponding equilibrium, this is the set of beliefs for a trader that are consistent with the same equilibrium allocation and prices. If a trader had to adopt different beliefs belonging to this set, the equilibrium outcome would remain unchanged. We show that, while in complete market economies the set of effectively identical beliefs admits only one element, under market incompleteness this set is not a singleton.
Moreover, it always admits probability distributions that are not equivalent to the truth. This result holds for all traders and in particular for surviving traders. Hence one can always find beliefs that differ significantly from the true probability distribution and that still allow a trader to survive and have 28 an impact on market outcomes in the long run.
An immediate corollary of our result is that heterogeneity of beliefs is persistent: surviving traders need not share the same beliefs in the long run.
Under incomplete markets asset prices reflect a range of underlying probability distributions that generate them. These distributions offer conflicting evidence on the probability of some events and influence asset prices. satisfy assumptions A1 − A6 in [14] , theorem 5.2 of [14] implies the existence of present value vectors ν i , i ∈ I so that (x, z), (p, q, (ν i ) i∈I ) is an equilibrium with transversality condition for the economy E ∞ (D, º 0 , ω, A). Incidentally, it follows that ν i = ψ i for all i ∈ I, since (ν i ) i∈I satisfies equation (8).
Proof of Proposition (4)
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists an equilibrium (x, z),
where trader i's preferences are represented by the expected utility E
Note that (ψ i ) i∈I must satisfy:
., ψ i (s t , S) ¢ . So, the above equation in matrix form is:
Where A t+1 (s t ) is an S × j(s t ) matrix and q(s t ) is a 1 ×j(s t ) vector. Since markets are complete, A is square and has full rank. So the above equation has a unique solution, which we know is
. Hence
for all s t ∈ T t , t ∈ T. Finally, in period 0, ψ(s 0 ) = π(s 0 ) by construction.
.) ∈ S. So λ i and ρ i agree on sets in ∪ t∈N F t . This set is closed under on (T ∞ , F ) by setting, recursively:
and such that system of equations (9) is satisfied (this is possible because markets are incomplete, see below). Then the resulting probability distribution λ i is different from ρ i but effectively identical to ρ i , by proposition (12) in section (7.1) .
How to choose an appropriate λ i (.|st) 6 = ρ i (.|st): Note that the set of equations in (9) can be rewritten as:
Where: Note that M i (st) has full rank equal to the rank of At +1 (st, ) < S − 1.
Since we know that ρ i (.|st) solves the system of equations in (9), we know the solution set Λ(st) is linear and of dimension at least 1. We know that ρ i (.|st) ∈ R S ++ and is interior to the unit simplex, by construction. Using the sup norm (kxk S = sup i∈S |x i |), choose an ε > 0 sufficiently small such that B ε (ρ i (.|st)) ⊂ R S ++ , and choose an elementλ i (.|st) ∈ B ε (ρ i (.|st)) ∩ Λ(st) such thatλ i (.|st) 6 = ρ i (.|st).
Proof of Proposition (8)
Proof. We use the construction in the proof of proposition (5) by choosing ε = ε 0 at the end of the proof. On each path s ∈ A i , build a probability distribution λ i by choosing λ i (.|s t ) ∈ [B ε 0 (ρ i (.|s t )) ∩ Λ(s t )] − B ε 0 /2 (ρ i (.|s t ))
for all s t , t ∈ T such that Rank(A j (s t , t+1)) < S−1 and such that s = (s t , ..).
If the rank condition is not satisfied on these paths, choose λ i (.|s t ) = ρ i (.|s t ).
For paths s / ∈ A i , choose λ i (.|s t ) = ρ i (.|s t ). . This s must exist by construction of λ i (.|s t ).
Inequality ( . There exists a T ε ∈ T such that t ≥ T ε ⇒ |a t − a| < ε and |b t − b| < ε. So if t ≥ T ε , a t > b t so a t > 
Proof of Proposition (11)
Proof. Consider an economy with 2 identical traders where ρ, δ, v, ω represent common beliefs, discount factors, Bernoulli utility and endowment processes. Given the common endowment process, consider the matrices: 
